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Abstract
We evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy in
a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy. We nd that corruption is pro-
cyclical and regulation policy is counter-cyclical. Corrupt politicians engage in excessive
stabilization of aggregate uctuations and behave as if they were Keynesian. We also nd
that business cycle shocks can induce political instability with politicians losing o¢ ce in
recessions.
Keywords: Corruption; entry regulation; performance voting; business cycles.
JEL classication: D72; K42; O41.
1 Introduction
Do politicians collect larger bribes in booms than in recessions? Do they introduce exces-
sive entry restrictions to create the articial scarcity needed to collect those extra bribes?
Do corrupt politicians engage in excessive stabilization of aggregate uctuations? Are cor-
rupt politicians Keynesian? Can business cycle shocks induce political instability? The
aim of this paper is to provide some answers to these questions.
We evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy
in a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy.1 A leading example of the
type of entry regulation that we have in mind comes from India. It takes the form of
comprehensive systems of industrial licensing that ..sought to regulate domestic entry
and import competition, ... to penalize unauthorized expansion of capacity, ... and indeed
to dene and delineate virtually all aspects of investment and production through a maze of
Kafkaesque controls (Bhagwati, 1993, pp. 49-50). Elected governments constructed that
maze from 1950 onwards and it started to be dismantled in the 1990s, in e¤orts initiated
by yet other elected governments. Similar systems developed in other countries in the
region, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan (Srinivasan, 2000).
The cost of complying with multiple legal requirements and red tape is another example
of the type of entry restrictions we want to capture. This phenomenon is extensively
documented by De Soto (1990) in his seminal study of the legal obstacles that a would-be
entrepreneur has to go through to operate a rm legally in Peru. He shows that it would
take more than 300 days of work at a cost of 32 times the monthly minimum wage to get
the permits and approvals needed to set up a small two-sewing machine clothing factory in
a Lima shanty town. No wonder that many would-be entrepreneurs prefer to stay informal
or are tempted to pay bribes to get the paperwork done faster. The corruption potential
in economies with excessive entry regulation is enormous, and it is not surprising that
empirical studies nd that corruption levels and measures of entry regulation are strongly
correlated: excessive entry regulation and corruption go hand in hand (e.g., Treisman,
2000; Djankov et al., 2002; Paldam, 2002). It is also interesting to note that after the
licensing system was dismantled, Indias score on Transparency Internationals corruption
perception index improved from around 2.7 in the mid-1990s to 3.5 in 2007. At the
same time, Sharma (2007) reports that industrial de-regulation during the 1980s led to a
signicant rise in rm productivity.
The tight connection between regulation of economic activity, allocative ine¢ ciency,
and corruption forms the cornerstone of our model: entry restrictions are implemented
and maintained by corruptible politicians because of their corruption potential. In the
model, governments can regulate entry into the production sector by issuing production
licenses. Output and wages increase, and prots decline with the number of licenses, or
the degree of liberalization. This sets the stage for social conict. Workers earn wages,
and would like to see the licensing system abolished. Entrepreneurs would like a license
for themselves, as it allows them to earn super-normal prots. Politicians are elected by
majority rule. Once in o¢ ce, they can restrict the number of licenses and charge for the
1The model is similar to the one developed in Aidt and Dutta (2008). In that paper, we use the model
to study the relationship between growth and corruption.
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ones they issue. This is the source of corruption.2 Their bribe income depends on having
the licensing system in place. The majority of the population are workers, and they lose
out. They attempt to control politicians by holding them accountable for their actions
while in o¢ ce. To this end, they set performance standards, and vote a politician out of
o¢ ce if he is too corruption and his performance fails to comply with the standard, as in
Ferejohn (1986), Coate and Morris (1999) and Persson et al. (1997).
Importantly, the economy is subject to (real) business cycle shocks. These impact
directly on wages, prots and output and are propagated by the licensing policy. We
study the cyclical properties of economic policy (industrial licensing) and corruption in
this environment. It matters greatly for outcomes whether shocks are observed by voters
or not. If voters can make their performance standards contingent on observed business
cycle conditions, it is constrained e¢ cient to induce politicians to behave as if they were
Keynesian. To get reelected, they must restrict entry into the economy in a boom and
allow entry in a recession. Economic policy entails excessive stabilization of aggregate
uctuations in a corrupt democracy and, as a consequence, corruption is pro-cyclical.
Politicians collect bribes in a boom, less so in a recession. In contrast, when shocks are
unobserved, they can induce political instability, as voters may rationally vote politicians
out of o¢ ce in recessions in order to discipline them in booms. This makes entry regulation
pro-cyclical and corruption counter-cyclical.
It is well-documented empirically that corruption depends on economic factors such as
the level of GDP, the growth rate of output, ination etc. (e.g., Treisman, 2000; Paldam,
2002). We are, however, not aware of any studies that evaluate corruption at the business
cycle frequency. The existing theoretical literature studies the link between economic
development (economic growth) and corruption.3 The focus is on the long run rather
than on short run implications of corruption. The main contribution of this paper is to
make a beginning at closing this gap. We do so by proposing a theory of corruption and
business cycle shocks. Before we present the theory, however, it is instructive to look at
some data on the cyclical properties of the industrial licensing system in India. Table 1
reports the correlation between the number of industrial licenses issued (or the number of
factories) and the Solow residual (in the previous year) for the pre-liberalization period
(1975-1989) and the post-liberalization period (1990-2003), respectively. The correlations
are conditional on unobserved state xed e¤ects and the number of rms in the previous
year. We observe, rstly, that the licensing policy is statistically signicantly a¤ected by
business cycle conditions. Insofar as industrial licenses are a major source of corruption,
this is indirect evidence that corruption has a cyclic component. Secondly, we notice
that the licensing policy is pro-cyclical in the period 1975-1989, but the number of rms
has been counter-cyclical since deregulation we pick 1990 arbitrarily: deregulation of
licenses started in the late 1980s and was essentially completed by 1993. In other words,
the cyclical properties of the number of rms seems to have changed dramatically after
2This concept of corruption is similar to the grabbing hand viewof government advocated by Shleifer
and Vishny (1993, 1994). For an overview of the vast literature on corruption, see Bardhan (1997), Rose-
Ackerman (1999), and Aidt (2003).
3See, for example, Murphy et al. (1991), Parente and Prescott (2000), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996),
Blackburn et al. (2006) and Aidt et al. (2008).
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Dependent variable Log(factories)t Log(factories)t
Period 1975-1989 1990-2003
Constant
3:32
(7:27)
0:99
(3:10)
Log(factories)t 1
0:66
(15:06)
0:87
(24:07)
Solow Residualt 1
0:14
(3:24)
 0:04
( 1:78)
Number of states 16 16
Number of observations 240 208
Notes: The regressions include state xed e¤ects.
t-statistics in brackets.
Table 1: The Relationship between the number of industrial enterprises and the Solow
residual in India, 1975-2003.
the liberalization initiated in the 1990s.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set out the economic
model. In Section 3, we describe the political system. In Section 4, we study regulation
policy and corruption in an economy that is subject to (real) business cycle shocks. In
Section 5, we conclude.
2 The Economy
We consider an economy with a continuum of individuals, indexed by j, with measure 1.5
The size of the population is constant. Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0; 1; 2;    . Each
individual has one unit of labor each period. A homogeneous consumption good, y, is
produced every period. Individuals live for ever, consume their net income each period,
and derive no utility from leisure. Utility is linear in consumption. The discount factor is
 2 (0; 1).
At any point in time, an individual can either be a worker or an entrepreneur. Workers
supply labor to a competitive labor market. Entrepreneurs run rms and supervise workers.
The rm owned by entrepreneur j produces with the following production technology:
yjt = Ats
1 
jt `

jt; 0 <  < 1; (1)
where `jt denotes the labor input hired by entrepreneur j; sjt denotes the time spend
on supervision by entrepreneur j; and At is the level of technology, common to all rms.
Prots are retained by the entrepreneur who runs the rm.
A would-be entrepreneur needs to obtain a license to operate a rm from the gov-
ernment. The politician running the government can choose the number of licenses and
4The source is Annual Survey of Industries data for 1975 -2003. Solow residuals calculated in the usual
way.
5The specication of the economy is inspired by Lucas (1978).
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determine who gets them. A license confers the right, but not the obligation to operate
a rm for one period. License holder j chooses how much time to spend on supervision,
sjt 2 [0; 1], and supplies the remaining part of her time endowment to the labor market.
Non-license holders have no choice of occupation. They work full time for a rm and
earn the real wage, wt. The real wage adjusts to clear the labor market each period. Let
t 2 [0; 1] be the number of licences issued in period t. We lose nothing by assuming that
licenses are held by individuals j 2 [0; t].
The state of the economy at time t is summarized by et = (At; t). In our analysis, the
stochastic process that drives At is exogenous, while t is endogenously determined. Let
nt  t be the number of rms operating in period t. National income is Yt =
R nt
0
yjtdj.
For any sequence of states fe0;    ; et;    g, with et  0, an equilibrium of the economy
is a sequence f   ; (nt; Yt; wt);    g such that all individuals and rms optimize, and the
labor market clears each period. We write jt = yjt   wt`jt as the equilibrium prot level
of rm j at time t. At a symmetric equilibrium, jt = t.
Proposition 1 establishes that the equilibrium is stationary: the number of rms, em-
ployment, and incomes depend only on the current state of the economy.
Proposition 1 Let et = (At; t) be the state of the economy at time t. An equilibrium
exists whenever et > 0. Let H = (1   ). Then equilibrium quantities and incomes are
functions of the current state of the economy only
n(et) = min[t; H ]; Y (et) = Atn(et)
1 (1  n(et));
w(et) = 
Y (et)
1  n(et) ; (et) = (1  )
Y (et)
n(et)
:
Furthermore, (et) = w(et) if and only if t  H ; otherwise (et) > w(et). For all et,
the number of workers is greater than or equal to . National income, Yt, is maximized
at nt = H . Wages increase and prots decrease with t whenever t < H . National
income, wages, and prots increase with At for all t 2 (0; 1].
Proof. See Appendix
When the number of licenses issued is less than H , all licenses are fully utilized and
they carry a scarcity rent, i.e., t > wt. The number of rms is nt = t and the licens-
ing system imposes a binding constraint on entry and output: the economy is allocative
ine¢ cient. When the number of licenses is greater than (or equal to) H , the economy is
fully liberalized. Licenses are no longer scarce and some are not utilized in equilibrium.
The number of rms is nt = H and each license holder is indi¤erent between being a
full time entrepreneur or a full time worker, i.e., t = wt. Liberalization achieves alloca-
tive e¢ ciency and maximum national income. Workers welcome this, while entrepreneurs
do not, as they see prots decline. This distributional impact is central to our analysis.
Positive productivity shocks increases national income, wages and prots proportionally.
Negative shocks has the opposite e¤ect. In an economy with H rms, these uctuations
are e¢ cient.
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3 A Representative Democracy
We wish to study the determination of entry regulation and corruption in societies with
representative democracy. In a representative democracy, voters delegate decisions to
elected politicians, who once in o¢ ce, are free to design the licensing system as they see
t. Voters can respond after the fact and hold the politician accountable for past decisions,
as in Ferejohn (1986). Proposition 1 shows that the fraction of workers is at least . We
assume that  > 1=2 and so the majority of the population are workers. For simplicity, we
refer to the worker-voters as the voters.6 Formally, the incumbent politician runs against
a challenger in the election held at the end of each period. He is reelected for another term
if he gains a majority. At the beginning of his tenure, voters announce an election rule,
t(:), specifying the probability of reelection as a function of observable indicators of the
politicians performance.7 We restrict attention to threshold election rules that specify a
performance standard that the politician has to satisfy to get reelection. That is, t(:) = 1
if the standard is satised and zero otherwise.
The fact that a license to run a rm can have economic value suggests that it can
be sold at a price. The incumbent politician has a temporary monopoly on the sale of
licences and is tempted to sell government property for personal gain.8 Each period, the
incumbent chooses t, and the price, bt, at which he sells each license. Accordingly, the
politicians bribe income is:
Bt = tbt: (2)
Lemma 1 evaluates the bribe function, relating the number of licenses to the maximum
surplus that can be extracted.
Lemma 1 The incumbent politician prices each license at bt where
bt = max[At
 
(1  )

1  


  


1  
1 !
; 0]: (3)
The politicians bribe income, Bt(t; At) = tbt, is maximized at
t = L  1
2
(2   
p
(4  3)) (4)
with 0 < L < H . L is independent of At while the maximized bribe income is propor-
tional to At.
Proof. See Appendix
In the absence of elections, the politician extracts the maximum bribe, B(L; At), every
period by setting t = L. Since L < H , the bribe maximizing policy imposes excessive
6Although entrepreneurs can also vote, it is without loss of generality that we focus exclusively on the
voting behavior of workers.
7The constrained e¢ cient performance standard may be specied in terms of the number of licenses or
in terms of utility levels depending on circumstances and on the information available to voters.
8This is the denition of corruption given by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
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regulation. The intuition follows from Proposition 1. A license is valuable only if it is
scarce. Liberalization reduces scarcity and the price each license commands. We note that
politicians can, ceteris paribus, for a given license policy extract more rent in a booming
economy than during a recession.
Politicians care about holding public o¢ ce for many reasons. One of them is that
power allows them to make money, because they can sell government property and earn
Bt. We assume that the payo¤ of the politician in o¢ ce at time t is
upt = Bt: (5)
We normalize the payo¤ of politicians out of o¢ ce to zero. We assume that there is
an unlimited supply of potential politicians willing to serve. Politicians apply the same
discount factor as citizens.
We can now dene the game between politicians, workers, and would-be entrepreneurs,
as it unfolds over time. Workers earn the market wage and get utility uwt = wt. Entrepre-
neurs have to pay the bribe, bt, to obtain their license. Lemma 1 implies that entrepreneurs
get per-period utility uet = t   bt = wt. The timing of events is as follows. At the be-
ginning of each period, a politician is already in o¢ ce. Voters announce a performance
standard. Next, the politician chooses how many licenses to issue and at what price.
Would-be entrepreneurs can accept or reject the o¤er of a license at the announced price.9
Once bribes and licenses have been exchanged, production takes place. Finally, at the end
of each period, an election is held. The outcome of the election is determined by the policy
implemented by the incumbent relative to the standard. After that, the sequence of events
repeats itself. With regard to the business cycle shock, we shall consider two scenarios. In
one scenario, the shock is realized at the beginning of each period and observed by every-
one. In the other, we assume that voters cannot observe business cycle conditions directly,
nor can they infer them from observing their wage income. This e¤ectively means that
we assume that voters cannot observe policy directly. We continue, however, to assume
that the politicians can observe the shock and tailor his policy to it. We require that
voters, given the information they hold about within-period events, set the performance
standard such that their life-time utility is maximized subject to the sequence of incentive
compatibility constraints and subject to equilibrium in the private sector.
4 Corruption and the Business Cycle
From Proposition 1, we know that the level of technology together with the licensing policy
determine all variables of economic interest at each t. Outcomes, hence, depend critically
on the sequence of technology levels. An implication, then, is that corruption varies with
the business cycle. Business cycle shocks are propagated by the licensing system which is
the only propagation mechanism operating in the model. Since the allocation of resources
9We could assume that the surplus is being split more evenly between the politician and the entre-
preneurs. This would bring out the underlying conict of interest between workers and entrepreneurs
more clearly. However, since this is not important for the results, we focus on the simpler case where the
politician has all bargaining power.
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is e¢ cient in the absence of a licensing system, any stabilization of aggregate uctuations
introduced by the system is ine¢ cient and excessive.
It matters greatly for the nature of these ine¢ ciencies, however, whether shocks are
observed by voters or not. As mentioned above, we consider two cases. In the rst case,
voters observe the state of the business cycle before they announce their performance
standard. In the second case, voters neither observe the state of the business cycle, nor
the policy choice (or the level of corruption). The politician, on the other hand, observes
the shock before setting the licensing policy.
4.1 The Corrupt Keynesian
To keep it simple, suppose that the stochastic process for technology shocks is given by
At =

1 + 
1
with probability p  0
with probability 1  p ; (6)
and that the shocks are independent over time. The economy is in a boom if At = 1+ > 1
and, else, in a recession. We interpret  as a measure of the amplitude of the cycle. The
probability p, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a crude measure of persistence. If,
for example, p is close to one booms are almost permanent in the sense that At is almost
always 1 + .
Voters observe the state of the business cycle before they announce the performance
standard for the period. In this case, it is without loss of generality that we specify the
election rule as a function of the observed policy directly, i.e.,
t(t;
s(At)) =

1
0
it  s(At)
otherwise
: (7)
Since business cycle conditions are known at the time when the standard is set, it is optimal
to tailor the performance standard to business cycle conditions. In particular, let
(At) =

B
R
if At = 1 + 
if At = 1
(8)
be the state dependent performance standard used by voters.
Proposition 2 Dene
B = maxfj (1 + )B(B) = (1   +  (1  p))B(L)g (9)
R = maxfjB(R) = (1     p)B(L)g: (10)
The constrained e¢ cient licensing policy is
1. t = B if At = 1 + 
2. t = R if At = 1
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with H > R > B > L.
Proof. Let voters announce the performance standard given in equation (8). If period
t is a boom, the value function of the politician is
vBt = (1 + )B (B) + max vt+1 (11)
and if period t is a recession, the value function is given by
vRt = B (R) + max vt+1: (12)
We note that vt+1 = pvBt+1 + (1  p) vRt+1. In either case, if the politician chooses a policy
below the standard, he is replaced by the challenger at the next election and his contin-
uation payo¤ is zero. Alternatively, he can choose a policy at or above the standard and
be reelected. The payo¤s associated with these two options are denoted vDi (:) and v
C
i (:),
respectively, for i 2 fR;Bg. The politician chooses t = s(At) if and only if the following
conditions are satised
v(s(At)) = max
t
vCi (t); (13)
v(s(At))  vDi (L) (14)
where i = B if A = 1 +  and i = R if A = 1. The rst condition is satised whenever
s(At) > L because B0(:)  0 for t  L. The second condition the incentive compat-
ibility condition requires that vBt  (1+)B(L) and vRt  B(L), respectively. Solving
equations (11) and (12), we get
vB =
B (R) (1  p) + (1 + )B (B) (1   (1  p))
(1  ) ; (15)
vR =
B (R) (1  p) +B (B) p(1 + )
1   : (16)
The constrained e¢ cient performance standard solves vB = (1+)B(L) and vR = B(L).
A simple calculation yields the expressions given in equations (9) and (10). Notice that
(1 +(1 p))
1+
  (1     p) = +p2
1+
> 0. Since B0 < 0, we conclude that R > B.
We note that R < H and B > L
Corollary 1 (The corrupt Keynesian) Corruption is pro-cyclical and economic policy
is counter-cyclical, i.e., entry regulation is lax in a recession and strict in a boom.
Proposition 2 shows that economic policy is more ine¢ cient during booms than during
recessions. Since ine¢ cient economic policy by itself reduces output this phenomena can
be interpreted as active Keynesian stabilization policy driven by the desire of corrupt
politicians to collect bribes. The other side of the coin, then, is that corruption is pro-
cyclical. A booming economy presents greater temptations, and politicians stand to gain
more from selling favors. As a consequence, societies must concede more to dishonest
politics. The intuition is straightforward. An increase in national income raises the stakes
because politicians can potentially extract much larger bribes. They are, therefore, more
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likely to defect from a given standard. Realizing this, voters are willing to accept more
entry restrictions and higher levels of corruption during a boom than during a recession.
An alternative intuition is that politicians want to get reelected in recessions so that they
can be around to collect large bribes in booms. This makes it easier for voters to discipline
politicians in a recession.
The distortion in economic policy is increasing in the amplitude of the cycle (). This
is simply because larger uctuations in output enhance the temptation to collect bribes
when the economy is booming. A high degree of persistence (as captured by a larger p)
makes it harder for voters to reduce corruption and to promote e¢ cient licensing policies
both in booms and recessions. The reason is that a high p makes the temptation to collect
bribes almost permanent. This makes it harder for voters to discipline their politicians and
corruption is as a result high most of the time. An implication of the analysis, then, is that
corruption tends to be high, on average, in societies with large, but relatively persistent
movements in technology.
4.2 Unobserved Shocks and Political Instability
Unobserved and unanticipated productivity shocks may result not only in cyclical move-
ments in economic policy, but also in political instability. In fact, it may be constrained
e¢ cient for voters to set performance standards that politicians cannot comply to in some
states of the world.
To see this, suppose that politicians have an informational advantage over workers.
While politicians can observe the state of the business cycle before deciding on the licensing
policy for the period, workers cannot observe neither At nor t. They only observe their
wage income wt = Atw (t). Workers must therefore specify the performance standard in
terms of utility levels (incomes), rather than in terms of policy outcomes. We continue
to assume that the stochastic process for At is given by equation (6) and that the shocks
are independent over time.10 We restrict attention to values of  that satisfy the following
condition:
Assumption 1  2

w(H)
w(B)
  1; w(H)
w(L)
  1

where B 2 (L; H) is dened in equation
(9).
The assumption ensures two things. It guarantees that workers can demand higher util-
ity levels in booms than in recessions. A su¢ cient condition for this is that the amplitude
of the cycle, , is larger than w(H)
w(B)
 1. On the other hand, if the the amplitude is too large,
workers can in e¤ect design a utility standard that replicates the constrained e¢ cient, state
dependent solution characterized in Proposition 2. In particular, this is possible if it is
impossible in a recession for a politician who liberalizes the economy completely to deliver
the lowest possible wage income that can be delivered in a boom ((1 + )w (L)). In this
case, workers simply ask for (1+)w(B) if w > (1 + )w (L) and for w (R) if not where
B and R are dened in Proposition 2. Politicians will comply to this, and outcomes are
10This rules out the possibility that workers can use any information that they learn about the state of
the business cycle in one period to predict what the state might be in the following period.
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as if workers could observe the cycle directly. To rule this possibility out, we assume that
 < w(H)
w(L)
 1. This implies that observing wage income is not su¢ cient to deduce if wages
are high because the economy is booming or because of liberalization.
Since workers can neither observe nor, under Assumption 1, deduce the state of the
business cycle, the performance standard must be state independent, i.e.,
t(wt;w
s) =

1
0
i wt  ws
otherwise
; (17)
where ws is the utility threshold required for reelection. Faced with the performance
standard ws politicians must implement a state dependent licensing policy in order to be
reelected. Denoting the best response to the standard ws in state i by i(ws) for i = B;R,
we can write the incentive compatibility constraints in the two states as
ICB : vBt = (1 + )B (B(w
s)) + vt+1  (1 + )B (L)
ICR : vRt = B (R(w
s)) + vt+1  B (L)
where vt+1 = pvBt+1 + (1  p) vRt+1. We can make the following preliminary observation.
Since ws is the same in a boom as in a recession, if the politician tries to comply, he
must issue more licenses in a recession than in a boom. Importantly, this implies that the
politician may not always be willing to comply in a recession. In particular, we can show
the following result.
Lemma 2 Let Assumption 1 be satised. If workers set ws such that the politician is just
willing to seek reelection in a boom (ICB binds), then the politician will not seek reelection
in a recession (ICR fails).
Proof. Assumption 1 implies that workers can demand higher utility in return for
reelection in a boom than in a recession. Let the highest utility standard that politicians
will comply to in a boom be wB and let the corresponding utility standard in a recession
be wR. The corresponding number of licences issued are B(wB) and R(wR). Suppose
that reelection requires delivery of at least wB at all times. In a recession, the politician
must issue licences 0R to satisfy w
B = w(0R) where 
0
R > R(w
R). It follows immediately
that the politician will not comply to this. Whenever ws is set to make ICB bind, he
accordingly deviates and sets  = L in a recession
Lemma 2 basically shows that workers face a trade o¤. If they want the politician to
implement the best possible licensing policy in a boom, they cannot get him to comply in
a recession. They may, therefore, consider setting a standard that the politician will, in
fact, satisfy in both states of the cycle. In this case, we can show the following result.
Lemma 3 Let Assumption 1 be satised. If workers set ws such that the politician is
just willing to seek reelection in a recession (ICR binds), then the politician will also seek
reelection in a boom (ICR is non-binding).
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Proof. Suppose that ws = wR is such that ICR binds. In a boom, the politician
can satisfy this standard by issuing licenses up to the point where wR = (1 + )w (0B).
Assumption 1 implies that 0B < B(w
R) and it follows immediately that the politician
will comply
The two lemmas allow us to restrict attention to two types of performance standards.
Performance standard PS1 is such that the politician only complies in a boom, while
performance standard PS2 is such that he always complies, and receives an additional rent
in a boom.
We begin by characterizing the performance standard of type PS1 that maximizes the
lifetime utility of workers. Suppose for this purpose that workers set a standard wPS1 that
makes ICB bind. Lemma 2 implies that the politician does not comply in a recession, and
the value function associated with that state of the cycle is
vRt = B(L): (18)
Given that, we can write the value function in a boom as
vBt = (1 + )B
 
B(w
PS1)

+ pvBt+1 +  (1  p)B(L): (19)
We can solve this equation to get
vB =
(1 + )B
 
B(w
PS1)

+  (1  p)B(L)
1  p : (20)
To maximize their wage income in a boom, workers set wPS1 such that vB = (1 + )B(L).
To satisfy this standard, the politician would have to issue PS1B 2 (L; H) licences in a
boom where PS1B is the largest  that solves
B () =
1   +  (1  p)
1 + 
B(L): (21)
We notice that PS1B = B. The optimal reelection threshold is thenw
PS1 = (1 + )w
 
PS1B

.
The expected lifetime utility of a worker is
UPS1 =
p (1 + )w
 
PS1B

+ (1  p)w (L)
1   : (22)
In a similar fashion, we can characterize the performance standard of type PS2 that
maximizes workerslifetime utility. Let wPS2 and PS2R denote the utility threshold required
for reelection and the licensing policy required in a recession to achieve the threshold,
respectively. Lemma 3 implies that the politician will also want to satisfy the utility
threshold wPS2 in a boom and can do so by setting 00B = w
 1

wPS2
1+

. Given that, we can
write the value functions associated with compliance in the two states as
vRt = B(
PS2
R ) + pv
B
t+1 +  (1  p) vRt+1 (23)
vBt = (1 + )B(
00
B) + pv
B
t+1 +  (1  p) vRt+1: (24)
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Solving for vB and substituting the result into the expression for vR and rearranging yields
vR =
(1  p)
1   B(
PS2
R ) +
p (1 + )
1   B(
00
B): (25)
To maximize their wage income in a recession subject to compliance, workers set wPS2
such that vR = B(L). To achieve this, the politician issues 
PS2
R licenses where 
PS2
R is
either the largest  that solves
B () =
(1  )B(L)  p (1 + )B(00B)
1  p (26)
or H if (1   )B(L)   p (1 + )B(00B) < 0. 
00
B is implicitly dened by w
 
PS2R

=
(1 + )w


00
B

. The optimal utility threshold of type PS2 accordingly is ws = w(PS2R ) 
w (H). The lifetime utility of workers is
UPS2 =
w
 
PS2R

1   : (27)
Comparing the maximized lifetime utility associated with the two types of performance
standards, we get the main result of the analysis.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. There exists a p 2 (0; 1) such that for
p > p, it is constrained e¢ cient for voters to use performance standard PS1.
Proof. A direct comparison of equations (22) and (27) yields that performance stan-
dard PS1 is better than performance standard PS2 i¤
p (1 + )w
 
PS1B

+ (1  p)w (L) > w
 
PS2R

: (28)
We noticew
 
PS2R
  w (H). It follows that (1 + )w  PS1B  > w (H)) (1 + )w  PS1B  >
w
 
PS2R

. Assumption 1 ensures that this is the case. It then follows that for p close enough
to 1, inequality (28) must hold
Corollary 2 (Political instability) Unobserved real business cycle shocks induce political
instability. Politicians lose o¢ ce during recessions and are reelected in booms.
The proposition and the corollary establish that it can be constrained e¢ cient for
workers to induce political instability. This happens when recessions are unlikely and the
amplitude of the cycle is moderately large. The intuition is that workers want politicians
to deliver as e¢ cient a policy in a boom as possible but is unable to tell when the economy
is booming. Unfortunately, politicians are unwilling to replicate this in a recession. They
then forgo reelection and collect the maximum bribe. Workers are willing to accept this
ine¢ ciency when recessions are rare. We observe that in contrast to the case where the
performance standard can be tailored to the cycle, performance standard PS2 magnies
rather than dampens aggregate uctuations. That is, more licenses are issued in a boom
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than in a recession. Moreover, measured by bribe income relative to GDP, corruption is
counter-cyclical. Lots of bribes are collected in a recession because politicians make no
attempt to get reelected, while in a boom they must pander to voters to stay in o¢ ce.
This result is consistent with evidence from numerous studies of vote and popularity
functions. This literature shows that incumbent politicians are much more likely to be re-
elected when economic conditions are benign than when they are not (see, e.g., Nannestad
and Paldam, 1994). This empirical regularity is usually interpreted as evidence that politi-
cians are rewarded for good performance. Our analysis, however, suggests an alternative
interpretation: it is rational for voters to ask too much of their politicians in recessions
and that is why they only get reelected in booms.
5 Conclusion
In a corrupt democracy, corruption levels and regulation of economic activity uctuate sys-
tematically with the business cycle. We show that corrupt politicians behave like Keyne-
sians when voters can tailor their performance standards to business cycle conditions. Eco-
nomic policy entails excessive stabilization of aggregate uctuations in a corrupt democ-
racy and, as a consequence, corruption levels are pro-cyclical. Politicians collect bribes in a
boom and hold back in a recession. In contrast, when voters cannot observe business cycle
conditions, it may be constrained e¢ cient to induce political instability with turnover of
politicians in recessions. In this case, entry regulation magnies aggregate uctuations
and corruption becomes counter-cyclical.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For each  > 0, individuals j   are license holders, and have
the right to choose sj > 0 and employ workers in their rm. Suppose sj(e) > 0. Prot
maximization implies
`j(e; w) = sj

A
w
 1
1 
and
yj = As
1 
j `

j  sjy(w); j = (1  )yj  sj(w):
A license holder earns (w)sj+w(1 sj) which is maximized at sj = 1 whenever (w) > w.
In this case, all licences are used, i.e., n(e) =  and the total supply of labor is 1   .
Labor market clearing requires that `j(e; w) = 1   . Therefore, equilibrium national
income, the wage rate, and prot per rm satisfy
Y (e) = A1 (1  ); w(e) =  Y (e)
1   ; (e) = (1  )
Y (e)

:
From these, we obtain the condition
(e) > w(e))  < (1  )  H :
Suppose   H . Let n  . Firms maximize prots and all labor is employed. Equilib-
rium national income, the wage rate, and prot per rm satisfy
Y (A; n) = An1 (1  n); w(A; n) = Y (A; n)
1  n ; (A; n) = (1  )
Y (A; n)
n
:
Note that n > 0 ) (A; n)  w(A; n) from the occupational choice of individuals j  ;
that n = H is the unique solution to (A; n) = w(A; n); and that (A; n) < w(A; n)
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whenever n > H . This establishes that (e) = w(e) ,   H and that n(e) = H for
  H . We see that 1  n(e)   for all e. Finally, write
Y (e) = An(e)1 (1  n(e)) with n(e) = min[; H ];
w(e) = A

n(e)
1  n(e)
1 
; (e) = (1  )A

1  n(e)
n(e)

:
We note that Y;w and  are monotonically increasing in A; that  and 1
w
decrease with
n; and that Y attains its maximum at n = H .
Lemma 1. A license is valid for one period. Its price, bt, cannot exceed its value
to the holder, i.e.,
bt  (t; At)  w(t; At): (29)
The politician extracts the entire surplus and so, condition (29) is binding. The total bribe
is
B(t; At) = t ((t; At)  w(t; At)) : (30)
The bribe function is concave and di¤erentiable, withB(0; At) = 0 = B(H ; At), lim!0B0(0; At) =
1, and B0(H ; At)  0. Hence, the total bribe income is maximized at some L 2 (0; H).
Note that L is stationary, and independent of productivity At. Thus, we can write
B(L; At) = AtB(t).
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